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Introduction
Negotiations on the European Recovery Instrument are in full swing . A central pillar 
of the European Commission’s (EC) proposal to mitigate the pandemic’s econom-
ic damage is the Solvency Support Instrument (SSI) . This program aims at helping 
struggling firms across the European Union (EU) by using €31bn of borrowings under 
the Recovery Instrument to provide a new guarantee to the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) . This is then supposed to mobilise about €300bn in private resources for 
capital injections in companies that are economically viable but run into funding is-
sues because of the crisis .
The SSI could become a powerful tool for the recovery: it provides fresh liquidity in 
the form of equity support for firms hit by the pandemic and can, thus, help compa-
nies and workers through the crisis without the negative side effects of increasing 
corporate indebtedness . By targeting support for firms in those member states in 
which national solvency aid, so far, has been more limited, it could also be an impor-
tant step towards securing a more symmetric recovery . 
In its current form, however, the proposal lacks political guidance and control. Select-
ing what firms will benefit under what conditions comes with difficult trade-offs and 
will have profound distributional effects on jobs, growth and the economic fabric 
of member states (MS) . By leaving these decisions largely to technocratic processes 
within the EIB and to market actors and attaching few if any conditions to the sup-
port, the SSI fails to make sure that European resources are spent in genuine Europe-
an interests . It, therefore, risks providing free lunch bailouts for owners and private 
investors without ensuring that public support cements jobs, avoids market concen-
tration, and puts firms on a growth path more conducive with the EU’s broader in-
dustrial policy goals . 
To remedy these shortcomings, we propose three major changes to the SSI:
1. The instrument needs to include clear political goals on geographical distribu-
tion, sectoral composition and size of firms targeted under the program with 
support linked to binding environmental and social conditions . 
2. Final beneficiaries should be selected by institutions that are well-versed in align-
ing market-based assessments with broader policy goals . National promotional 
banks and institutions (NPBIs) banks should, therefore, be put in the lead.
3. The instrument needs better political control. Larger suboperations exceeding 
€100M of European exposure should, therefore, be approved by a new Equity Su-
pervision Board made up of representatives from the Council, the European Par-
liament, and the Commission .
 
“In its current form, 
SSI fails to make 
sure that European 
resources are spent 
in genuine European 
Interests.”
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1 Why do we need European equity support?
The pandemic is hitting companies across Europe . Depending on the data and un-
derlying assumptions, studies have estimated that after three months of lockdown, 
between 25% and more than 50% of all EU firms could face liquidity shortfalls .1 
The EC’s own projections put the lower end of potential equity losses across the 
Union at about €720bn .2 Crucially, these losses are concentrated amongst firms in 
a handful of major sectors, including accommodation and food services, transport, 
wholesale and retail trade as well as some areas of manufacturing and they are 
especially prevalent amongst small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) .3
Left unattended, these liquidity shortfalls could quickly turn into solvency issues 
for firms and may permanently scar European economies. Counter-vailing policies 
so far have mainly focused on loans and credit guarantees .4 While such measures 
can provide important short-term support, they may also lead to a massive in-
crease in corporate indebtedness, raise the risk of future defaults and leave firms 
with little room for growth and investment once economic growth picks up again .5
Equity support can circumvent this problem . Put simply, equity-based programs 
provide firms with fresh liquidity by using public money to buy shares or take on 
other forms of equity stakes in private companies . This injects capital without 
raising firms’ leverage and, at the same time, allows taxpayers to participate in 
future profits . Against this background, some MS have already started to provide 
their firms with national equity support . However, national fiscal capacity to set 
up such schemes differs widely and, without European coordination, corporate 
over-indebtedness in some weaker economies could easily produce systemic risks 
for the entire Union. 
To avoid this and to make sure that European companies, no matter what their 
home country is, have the chance to survive the crisis, a joint European equity sup-
port scheme is indeed warranted . However, the use of public money for equity sup-
port also comes with severe risks and massive distributional implications: deciding 
who is supported and who is not will have a huge impact on job losses, capital 
gains and Europe’s post-recovery economic structure. Getting this right is, there-
fore, important and we suggest it should be guided by the following principles .
1 Revoltella et al . (2020): “EU firms in the post-COVID-19 environment: Investment-debt 
trade-offs and the optimal sequencing of policy responses”, VoxEU .org, 23 June; Demmou et 
al . (2020), “Corporate sector vulnerabilities during the COVID-19 outbreak: Assessment and 
policy responses”, VoxEU .org, 23 May; Banerjee et al . (2020), “COVID-19 and corporate sector 
liquidity”, BIS Bulletin No . 10, 28 April . 
2 EC (2020), “Identifying Europe’s recovery needs”, Commission Staff working document, 27 May .
3 Carletti et al . (2020): The equity shortfall of Italian firms in the COVID crisis: A first assess-
ment. VoxEU .org, 19 June .  
4 Redeker & Hainbach (2020): “Flattening the Recession Curve: Fiscal Responses to the Corona 
Crisis”, Delors Centre Policy Paper, April 2020 . 
5 Boot et al (2020): “Coronavirus and financial stability 3.0: Try equity – risk sharing for com-
panies, large and small”, VoxEU .org, 3 April .
“Without European 
coordination,  
corporate over- 
indebtedness in 
some weaker  
economies could  
easily produce  
systemic risks for  
the entire Union.”
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1.1 Help firms in countries with limited room for national support
The central aim of European equity support should be to support struggling firms 
in those MS where liquidity shortfalls are especially pronounced and national sup-
port schemes remain more limited . Given the concentration of liquidity shortfalls 
in some key sectors as well as amongst small firms, the need for equity support is 
likely to be especially large in countries like Greece, Italy and a number of Eastern 
European countries (see Figure 1) . Many of these, so far, have provided comparably 
little national liquidity support . To reduce the risk of persistent economic damage 
and ensure that viable businesses can survive the crisis, European equity support 
should be concentrated in severely impacted but fiscally constrained MS. 
Figure 1: MS vulnerability to equity losses 
Sectors with large equity shortfalls are defined as NACE sectors I, H, G and C . 
Small firms include companies with less than 50 employees . 
Data: Eurostat .
1.2 Lean against market concentration
Already before the corona crisis, European market concentration was on the rise .6 
The pandemic will further accelerate this trend . On the one hand, big firms with 
higher margins and larger cash buffers are less likely to run into liquidity issues .7 
On the other hand, firms in stronger positions are likely to exploit the rise in asset 
erosion and forced exits amongst competitors for mergers and acquisitions to fur-
ther consolidate their dominance .8 Bucking this trend and preserving competitive 
product- and deep labor markets will be key to safeguarding European productiv-
ity and avoiding even greater inequality . Equity support, therefore, needs to be 
designed in ways that avoid market concentration. 
 
6 IMF (2019): World Economic Outlook – Growth Slowdown and Precarious Recovery.
7 Revoltella et al . (2020): “EU firms in the post-COVID-19 environment: Investment-debt 
trade-offs and the optimal sequencing of policy responses”, VoxEU .org, 23 June;
8 OECD (2020): Merger control in the time of COVID-19.
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1.3 Prioritise jobs over owners 
Supporting viable businesses through the crisis is crucial to avoid any negative 
economic downward spirals . However, any form of European equity support im-
plies significant socialization of private risks and constitutes direct public help for 
business owners . As private business ownership is heavily concentrated at the top 
of the income distribution in all member states (see Figure 2) equity support will 
directly benefit very wealthy households in particular. To ensure that the gains 
of equity support are widely shared instead, a European instrument should make 
saving jobs and creating new ones the key priority . At the same time, it should 
minimise the risk of moral hazard, make sure that internal resources stay within 
supported companies and prevent insiders from extracting wealth .
1.4 Align equity support with the EU’s broader industrial policy agenda
To maximise the public value of solvency support, European resources should be 
used to advance longer-term policy goals such as the transition towards less car-
bon-intensive and more digitialised modes of production . Some have, therefore, 
suggested providing companies in specific sectors such as green technology with 
privileged access to equity support . However, such an approach could directly con-
flict with the principle goal of limiting long-run economic damage by safeguard-
ing firms and jobs in those sectors most affected by the crisis . Instead, solvency 
support should be broadly available to all ailing firms but come with clear condi-
tions that incentivise ecological and digital transition within them . 
Figure 2: Share of private business wealth owned by the Top 10 Percent in 
selected MS
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2 The Commission’s Proposal:  
Solvency Support Instrument 
To answer the calls for a new tool for equity support at European level, the Com-
mission has proposed a Solvency Support Instrument (SSI) as part of its overall 
Recovery Instrument . The SSI would serve as a temporary third window under 
the extant European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) and should be up and 
running by no later than October 2020 . 
The central idea behind this new tool is to use part of the money that the EU 
will jointly raise on financial markets under the Recovery Instrument to increase 
its guarantee to the European Investment Bank (EIB) under EFSI . According to 
the EC, this guarantee should be raised by €66bn, which, given a provision rate 
of 50%, would require EU budget resources of about €33bn . It is important to 
note that the EIB would not use this new guarantee to acquire stakes in strug-
gling firms . Instead it would pass the guarantee on to financial intermediaries 
in member states, thereby crowding-in additional capital by decreasing the risk 
of private investors . In doing so, the Commission hopes to mobilise an overall 
sum of €300bn in fresh equity support for European firms. However, the new 
proposal by European Council President Charles Michel has already cut the pro-
posed budget resources for the SSI to €26bn, which would significantly reduce 
the instrument’s reach . In any case, the program is supposed to run until the end 
of 2024 with 60% of operations approved by the end of 2022 .
 
Figure 3: The proposed Solvency Support Instrument
Figure 3 above shows how this would work in practice . The EU would mobi-
lise equity support by reducing risks for private investors through channeling 
guarantees towards, investing in or funding financial intermediaries . Decisions 
about which financial intermediaries should benefit from the EU guarantee will 
be made by EIB staff . Under the EFSI framework, these decisions need the ap-
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proval of an Investment Committee, which is composed of eight financial sector 
experts and headed by the EFSI Managing Director . At the top of the govern-
ance structure sits the Steering Board consisting of three representatives from 
the Commission, one EIB official and an observer from the European Parliament . 
This board sets overall investment guidelines, reviews the SSI’s functioning on a 
quarterly basis and appoints the Investment Committee .
The SSI’s current structure would mean that neither Commission nor EIB is in-
volved in making the final call on what companies on the ground will benefit 
from the money provided by European taxpayers. This decision will be taken 
exclusively by financial intermediaries and independent, commercially-run fund 
managers . To crowd in private capital, such intermediaries could include not 
only National promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs) but also private equity 
funds, special purpose vehicles and investment platforms . In exceptional cases, 
the EIB might also invest directly .
In selecting the companies to invest in, financial intermediaries would have rel-
atively free rein. Companies that receive support would only need to prove that 
they were not in financial difficulties at the end of 2019 . While the proposed 
regulation does not include any geographical quotas, it stipulates that the Steer-
ing Board should establish geographical concentration limits to ensure that the 
bulk of the EU guarantee supports eligible companies in member states severe-
ly impacted by the crisis and where national solvency support is more limited . 
However, the proposal does not include targets on sectoral composition or size 
of companies to be supported under the SSI .
For beneficiary firms, equity support would come with few strings attached. 
Firms targeted by financial intermediaries “shall be encouraged to comply, to 
the extent possible, with minimum high level social and environmental safe-
guards” . and companies that engage in ecologically especially harmful activity 
“shall be encouraged to put in place, in the future, green transition plans .” No 
other environmental or social provisions are included and the terms of updated 
State Aid rules – such as a ban on dividends, bonus payments and share buy-
backs – would only apply to support provided on non-commercial terms . 
3 What does the Commission’s  
proposal amount to?
How does this proposal hold up against the principles outlined above? In line 
with the first principle, establishing geographical concentration limits could 
help ensure that EU equity support predominantly helps firms in weaker mem-
ber states . Otherwise, however, the proposal provides little in terms of avoiding 
market concentration, safeguarding employment, or aligning equity support 
with broader industrial policy goals. 
Instead, the proposal addresses the goal of rolling out a huge amount of mon-
ey across many member states and thousands of firms in a very short period 
of time by building on existing, market-driven instruments and maximizing 
flexibility . There is little political guidance on the distribution of the funds; EIB 
“In selecting the 
companies to invest 
in, financial inter-
mediaries would have 
relatively free rein.”
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personnel have significant discretion in selecting any public or private financial 
intermediaries they see fit for the purpose of delivering equity support; it del-
egates the task of selecting beneficiary companies to financial intermediaries 
and it attaches minimal conditions to the provision of equity aid at the firm level . 
From an EIB/EC perspective this is a comprehensible approach . However, the 
combination of severe time-pressure and considerable discretion for techno-
cratic staff and market actors leaves little room for any political guidance . This 
is problematic . First, the issue of who benefits from the instrument will have 
profound distributional implications across and within member states and will 
shape Europe’s economic structures for decades to come . Relying almost exclu-
sively on technocratic, market-driven processes in making these decisions runs 
the risk that European funds are employed in ways that maximise profits for 
private investors rather than prioritise competitive labor and product markets, 
safeguard employment and align support with EU industrial policy goals . Second, 
the new EIB guarantee is based on a large amount of new and jointly borrowed 
money that will be used to invest in highly risky portfolios . Ensuring proper po-
litical control is, therefore, key to safeguarding the program’s legitimacy and to 
make sure that public resources are used with clear regard to public interests . 
The SSI design, therefore, needs a serious rethink . 
4 Aligning Public Equity Support  
with the Public Interest
Without proper political guidance and oversight, the proposed SSI runs the risk 
of turning into a subsidy program for private intermediaries providing free-
lunch bailouts for European company owners . To remedy these shortcomings, 
we propose three major changes . 
•	 First, the instrument needs clearer political guidelines and conditions on which 
companies should be supported and under what conditions . 
•	  Second, financial institutions with a clear public mission need to be put in the 
driver’s seat of selecting final beneficiaries . 
•	 And third, political control needs to be strengthened, especially when it comes 
to large projects . 
4.1 Determine Clear Criteria for Equity Support 
Evaluating which companies are viable over the longer run is a tricky business . 
The SSI starts from the reasonable premise that politicians should not take the 
lead in making that decision . However, this makes it all the more important to 
equip the instrument with clear guidelines on what companies should be sup-
ported and under what conditions. 
First, the current proposal provides too little guidance on what companies 
should be targeted . Besides leaving it to the Steering Board to define geographi-
cal concentration limits, the proposed regulation merely states that most of the 
EU guarantees should support eligible companies in member states and sectors 
most affected by the crisis . This leaves too much room for interpretation . Clear 
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goals are needed to ensure that the lion’s share of support goes to those sectors 
and companies most in need. 
Besides defining vulnerable sectors, selection criteria need to be specified on 
two other fronts . To make sure that equity support only goes to companies that 
do not vitiate Europe’s green transition, the regulation should clearly state that 
economic activities that undermine the attainment of Europe’s climate targets, 
such as fossil fuel projects, cannot be supported. To avoid market concentration, 
the regulation also needs to do more to specifically steer equity support towards 
SMEs . Providing equity support for smaller, non-listed firms whose economic 
value is more difficult to determine is complex . It is, therefore, helpful that the 
proposal is open to quasi-equity support such as hybrid debt and preferred stock . 
However, given that the provision of equity-like investments in SMEs is more 
difficult and that the instrument will operate under strict time constraints, it 
still remains likely that larger firms in more dominant market positions will get 
privileged access . The instrument, therefore, needs a clear quantitative target 
on how much of the guarantee should be earmarked for supporting SMEs. 
Clearer criteria are not just required for the selection of companies but also for 
the conditions that companies must meet to receive European equity support . 
The SSI as it stands entails no binding conditionality . To avoid free lunch bail-
outs and align the instrument with Europe’s industrial policy goals this must 
change . First, it needs to set out clear goals on the extent to which supported 
firms should cut their carbon emissions. Targets should differ depending on sec-
tor and corporate size but need to be specific enough to allow company owners 
to be held accountable . Failures to abide by these targets should bring an imme-
diate loss of funding . 
Second, providing equity support should be linked to securing jobs . One might 
argue that equity support confronts a trade-off between preserving productive 
company-employee relations and facilitating the reallocation of workers to sec-
tors more viable in the long term .9 However, whether the crisis will result in a 
permanent restructuring of economic activity remains far from clear .10 If limit-
ed public resources are used to provide equity support to private owners, this 
should be reserved for business models that remain viable without the need 
to shed large swaths of their workforce. The SSI, therefore, needs clear goals on 
the aggregate share of employment retained or created in the firms enjoying EU 
equity support . 
Finally, in line with the EC’s updated state aid rules, beneficiaries should curb 
executive remuneration and refrain from extracting capital through dividends, 
payouts and share buybacks . The current proposal mandates such measures 
only if equity support is given on non-commercial terms . However, determining 
whether this is the case is difficult in the midst of a deep downturn, leaving 
financial intermediaries with considerable discretion in categorizing the nature 
of their support . To circumvent possible conflicts of interest, these specific rules 
should, therefore, apply to all equity support provided under the SSI . 
9 Barrero et al . (2020): “Covid-19 is also a reallocation shock”. NBER Working Paper 27137 .
10 Pagano et al . (2020): “COVID-19, asset prices, and the Great Reallocation .” VoxEU .org, 11 
June; Fujita et al . (2020): “The labour market policy response to COVID-19 must save aggre-
gate matching capital”, VoxEU .org, 30 March . 
“The regulation 
should clearly state 
that economic  
activities that under-
mine the attainment 
of Europe’s climate  
targets cannot be 
supported.”
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4.2 Put public institutions in the lead of the rollout
Even with clear political guidelines, investment decisions on the ground will still 
need to resolve major trade-offs . This includes, for example, whether limited 
resources should be channeled towards labor-intensive industries with weaker 
balance-sheets in which corporate liquidation would have a bigger impact on 
overall employment or be used for sectors with greater prospects for growth . 
Similarly, one needs to know whether equity support should go to risky firms 
in key sectors or be reserved for more conservative investments in bigger com-
panies enjoying strong market positions . In contrast to the some of the ideas 
discussed prominently earlier in the crisis,11 the SSI does not create a new inde-
pendent European institution to make these judgement calls but delegates it to 
a range of possible financial intermediaries including private funds .
Being flexible about possible intermediaries and relying on private funds may 
help leverage and increase efficiency on paper . However, when looking at the 
trade-offs lined out above, the interest of private investors and the European 
public as a whole are unlikely to be constantly aligned. Moreover, organizing 
equity support by de-risking the portfolios of private equity funds would imply 
using taxpayer money to subsidise the incomes of financial actors that already 
sit on a huge amount of dry powder from soaring profits in the run-up to the 
crisis .12 To avoid these problems, calling the shots on final investment decisions 
should be left to public institutions that are able to align market-based assess-
ments with national and European policy goals . 
In the short term, this means providing NPBIs which in most cases are already 
deeply involved in national crisis policies13 with exclusive rights to select eligible 
companies. To ensure a quick rollout across the EU, public institutions in smaller 
member states may seek the support of promotional and investment banks in 
other MS international institutions or buy in external expertise . Critically, these 
banks would still work closely with other investors and crowd-in private capital . 
However, it would be ensured that that decisions on public money are taken by 
institutions with a clear public mission .
In the medium term, the EIB should get resources to hire more staff that is able 
to carry out business valuations in member states. This would enable Europe’s 
largest promotional bank to undertake equity support without relying on finan-
cial intermediaries provided . This may also include working on an independent 
public European equity fund that is led by public officials and tailored specifical-
ly to the needs of SMEs such as proposed by Boot et al . (2020) .
11 Boot et al (2020): “Coronavirus and financial stability 3.0: Try equity – risk sharing for com-
panies, large and small”, VoxEU .org, 3 April .
12 PWC (2019): „Private Equity Trend Report – Powering Through Uncertainty”
13 ELIT (2020): “Overview of measures against the economic impact of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) 
outbreak” 
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4.3 Ensure proper political control 
Besides providing clear political guidelines for equity support and a strong role 
for public intermediaries in delivering it, the SSI also needs better political con-
trol . In its current form, decisions on passing EU guarantees on to financial inter-
mediaries is largely taken by EIB staff and only subject to the approval of an In-
vestment Committee composed of financial sector experts . Given the profound 
distributional implications that the instrument is going to have on corporate 
survival, employment, and the industrial structure of member states in the re-
covery, this technocratic oversight is insufficient . 
This must change . We propose setting up a new political control board under the 
EFSI as part of the SSI which could be labelled an Equity Support Board . Given 
that the SSI will be funded directly by fresh borrowings under the Recovery In-
strument, this new board should consist of an equal number of representatives 
from the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council as the 
three institutions in charge of the EU Budget . 
Its purpose would be to approve large-scale suboperations of financial interme-
diaries . If a national promotional bank decided to make an equity investment 
in which the share of European resources put at risk exceeds €100M, the Equity 
Support Board would need to assess whether this substantial support is war-
ranted by common European interest and ensure that it goes hand in hand with 
high environmental and social provisions . If this is not the case, a majority of 
board members could decline support under the SSI. Any suboperations below 
the threshold of €100M would follow the normal procedure and not require ad-
ditional approval .
An institution along these lines could easily be installed as part of the current 
EFIS set-up . Doing so would substantially improve political control of large-scale 
equity support measures, make sure that due diligence is carried out with regard 
to common European interest and improve the longer-term legitimacy of equity 
support decisions . At the same time, limiting the need for Equity Support Board 
approval to larger sub-operations would not hamper the speedy provision of eq-
uity support, especially when it comes to smaller operations and SMEs . 
Conclusion
The SSI constitutes a promising tool with huge potential to help struggling com-
panies through the crisis, accelerate the recovery and mitigate some of the asym-
metric effects of the pandemic across the EU . To realise this potential and make 
sure that equity provisions help ailing member states, curb the rise of market 
concentration, secure employment and foster the EU’s broader policy goals, the 
current proposal, however, needs a serious rethink . It needs clearer criteria for eq-
uity support, a stronger role for public institutions and tighter political oversight . 
Delivering on these goals will make the instrument both more effective and le-
gitimate and ensure that the fruits of public corporate support are shared widely . 
“If this is not the 
case, a majority of 
board members  
could decline support 
under the SSI.”
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